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Nepotism refers to the practice of giving preferential treatment to family members and is
prohibited in some work organizations. Common anti-nepotism policies are often based
on the unsubstantiated assumption that family relationships negatively affect
performance. This study challenges this assumption with the hypothesis that family
relationships improve team performance. The theoretical basis for this hypothesis is
grounded in the literature examining team processes. Research suggests that coordination
is an important team process, and that family members coordinate more effectively than
non-family members. Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that familial relationships in teams
will lead to better – rather than worse team performance. To test this hypothesis, over 100
years of performance data from 477 men's college basketball teams were analyzed.
Results suggest that familial relationships in teams is positively related to better team
performance.
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INTRODUCTION

Common anti-nepotism policies are based on the unsubstantiated assumption that
familial relationships negatively affect certain group processes. This study will challenge
this assumption and examine whether team performance is affected by familial
relationships. The findings from this study will be used to address a fundamental question
regarding nepotism in work organizations: Do nepotistic relationships in the workplace
affect team performance?

Nepotism
Nepotism refers to the practice of giving preferential treatment to family
members, and is prohibited in some work organizations. For example, many
organizations (e.g. Pizza Hut, Wal-Mart, etc.) have policies that prohibit supervisorsubordinate relationships between relatives, including spouses, parents, siblings and
offspring. Similarly, the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB Reports, 2012) has
established policies prohibiting public officials from appointing, employing, promoting,
or recommending family members. However, there are many examples in politics,
entertainment, and sports where familial relationships are common and even accepted in
work organizations (Bellow, 2003). Thus, nepotism does exist but it remains to be seen
whether anti-nepotism policies are justified.
Nepotism policies are essentially selection devices which have received little
research attention. The legal issues surrounding the use of nepotism policies as selection
devices have been highlighted on several occasions (Gutman, 2012; Jones et al., 2008).
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Both policies that prohibit and promote nepotism have been tested in court cases
(Gutman, 2012). In one such case, an anti-nepotism policy led to disparate treatment
against women in an organization that prohibited spousal hiring (EEOC v. Rath Packing
Company, 1986). Ultimately, the court reasoned that the organization’s anti-nepotism
policies should have been based on the actual effects of nepotism and not perceptions
(Gutman, 2012). Such cases provide examples of policies that act as troublesome, unvalidated selection devices (Jones et al., 2008).
The potential problems associated with familial relationships in the workplace
may have contributed to the creation of anti-nepotism policies. Nepotistic relationships
may foster perceptions of injustice, increased stress, and decreased job satisfaction
(Arsali & Tumer, 2008). Contrarily, some researchers have presented family-workplace
relationships in a positive light. For instance, some research suggests the growing number
of dual-career couples are benefiting from more positive work-life balance (Werbel &
Hames, 1996). Other research suggests familial relationships may foster a more
productive organizational culture (Dension, Lief, & Ward, 2004) and increase employee
accountability (Gordon & Nicholson, 2008). In addition, the presence of familial
relationships in organizations has been associated with increased commitment, cohesion,
and longer-term orientation (Vallejo, 2008). There is also some evidence that perceptions
of organizational fairness can both be enhanced (Woolsey, 2014; Laker & Williams,
2003) and diminished (Darioly & Riggio, 2014) by perceived nepotism.
While prior studies have examined perceived nepotism as a predictor of
perceptions (e.g. commitment, satisfaction, justice), the present study will examine the
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actual link between familial relationships and performance. This will provide
organizational decision makers a further basis from which to consider nepotism policies.

A Group Phenomenon
Nepotism preferences rely on at least a dyadic interaction. So, by definition,
nepotism is a group phenomenon. In order to understand the effects of nepotism on
performance, we need to understand the effect it may have at the group level.
While several definitions for work groups have been proposed, this study will
adopt a definition which delineates the differences between task forces, crews, and teams.
This distinction is based on tasks, tools, and members (Jones, Stevens, & Fischer, 1999).
Task forces are defined by tasks, and typically disband when the defined tasks are
completed. For example, governmental task forces have been formed to address natural
disasters, terrorist attacks, and drug problems. The work of crews is defined by the tools
used to accomplish tasks. In tank crews for instance (Tibbetts, 1995; Tziner & Vardi,
1983), roles are defined by the machinery crew members use (i.e. loader, driver, gunner,
spotter, tank commander). Crew members are interchangeable and their ongoing tasks are
defined by the procedural tools used (Jones et al., 1999). Teams are denoted by complex
interdependencies among members. Membership boundaries and tasks are carried out
through the use of skills.
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Group Processes
There is a large body of literature examining factors that affect team performance.
Two important factors are collaboration and coordination. Collaboration has been defined
as individuals working together toward a common goal that is beyond what a single party
can reach alone (Forest, 2003), and has been cited as one of the main contributors to the
success of our species (Melis, 2013). Coordination, a form of organized collaboration,
has been described as real-time behavioral processes unfolding as humans interact
(Gorman, Amazeen, & Cooke, 2010; Kolbe & Boos, 2009). Coordination has also been
described as the effective alignment and utilization of individual actions (Gulati,
Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012) manifested as a shared understanding of behavioral
cues that align each partner’s expectations (Mehta, Starmer, & Sugden, 1994).
Research suggests that collaboration and coordination are important processes for
understanding group performance. For instance, one study highlighted the criticality of
effective collaboration and coordination within the context of military units (Salas,
Cooke, and Gorman, 2010). A similar study suggests that the use of collaborative tools
has a positive influence on team performance (Hidayanto & Setyady, 2014). Moreover,
face-to-face collaboration facilitates development of shared mental models (Andres,
2011), which generally enhance performance (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994).
In addition to shared mental models, there is a growing literature on recognition
of expertise, and its importance to group effectiveness (Baumann & Bonner, 2013;
Bonner, 2004; Littlepage & Mueller, 1997). A substantive collection of literature also
exists examining other important group process variables such as backup behaviors and
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mutual trust (Salas, Goodwin, & Burke, 2009). For purposes of this study, these
processes will be classified as behavioral markers of coordination.
Recognition of expertise refers to the process in which group members develop an
understanding of the different knowledge bases and skill sets possessed by different
group members (Ho & Wong, 2009). Backup behaviors are defined as “the ability to
anticipate other team member’s needs through accurate knowledge about their
responsibilities” (Salas et al., 2009). Over time, team members foster interaction and
form expectations of one another’s behavior (Jones et al., 1999) which form the basis for
the knowledge structures often referred to as shared mental models (Cannon-Bowers,
Salas, & Converse, 1993). Basketball teams are one example of team structures in which
shared mental models among members govern coordination (i.e. mutuality and
awareness) when overt communication is difficult (Gershgoren, 2013; Bourbousson,
Poizat, Saury, & Seve, 2010).

Collaboration, Coordination, and Familial Relationships
Early in life, family interactions present individuals with their first opportunities
to engage in collaboration and coordination. Thus, the family unit may be thought of as
the first group where most individuals learn collaboration and coordination.
Two studies suggest that coordination is more effective among family members
compared to non-family members. One study (Segal, McGuire, Miller, & Havlena, 2008)
compared tacit coordination (coordination when communication is not possible)
displayed by twin siblings with that of non-related pairs of individuals. It was
hypothesized that twin siblings would exhibit more effective tacit communication based
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on the “greater resemblance in mental abilities, information processing strategies, and
temperamental dispositions.” The findings were consistent with the hypothesis:
monozygotic twins showed greater coordination than did either dizygotic twins or other
matched pairs (Segal et al., 2008).
Family members may also be more aware of one another’s strengths and
weaknesses in performing a group task (recognition of expertise). For example, a study
on family firms in China suggests that guanxi, a type of social capital related to familial
relations, is associated with easier transfer of tacit knowledge (Su & Carney, 2013).

Hypotheses
Based on the existing literature, it is reasonable to suspect that familial
relationships in teams will lead to better –rather than worse team performance. In the
current study, college basketball teams will be used for hypothesis testing. There are
known familial relationships in basketball teams which allow for testing the effects of
familial relationships on team performance. In addition, the effect of the different types
of familial relationships will be tested in an exploratory manner. The following
hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 1: Team performance is expected to be positively related to the
presence of familial relationships in teams.
Hypothesis 2: Team processes are expected to be positively related the presence
of familial relationships in teams.
Hypothesis 3: Team processes are expected to mediate the relationship between
familial relationships in teams and team performance.
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METHODS

Overview
Based on the definition of teams offered above (Jones et al., 1999), college
basketball is a team sport. To test the hypotheses, archival data were gathered from
performance records of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) DI men’s
basketball teams. These data included performance metrics, records of familial
relationships on teams, and team process measures, all of which will be described in
greater detail below.

Measures
Team performance will be assessed using Win/Loss Percentage, NCAA
Tournament Berths, Final Four Appearances, and National Championship Wins.
The documented team-family relationships all consist of fathers, sons, and
brothers. These relationships were analyzed in two ways. First, an overall analysis of
familial relationships (regardless of type) was used. Familial relationships were measured
by frequency (i.e. two family members = one relationship, three family members = three
relationships). Relationships among players, among coaching staff, and between players
and coaching staff were all included in this variable. Separate analyses were also
conducted on these familial relationship types, coded as Coach-Coach, Player-Player, and
Coach-Player.
Self-report measures of recognition of expertise, shared mental models, and backup behaviors are unavailable in this archival dataset. However, there are certain metrics
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that may be indicative of some of these group processes. For instance, Assist/Turnover
Ratio and Offensive Rebound Percentage may represent recognition of expertise on
offense. An assist is recorded when a player completes a pass to another player who
scores shortly after. A turnover is recorded when a player's action grants the opposing
team a possession (via rule violation, passing the ball to an opponent, etc.).
Assist/Turnover Ratio is calculated by dividing the team's total number of assists by their
total number of turnovers. As players spend more time interacting, they become more
familiar with the strengths, weaknesses, and tendencies of each other. This recognition of
expertise (i.e. coordination) is expected to theoretically lead to more complete passes
(leading to scores) and less incomplete passes (leading to turnovers), as individuals more
accurately predict each other's behavior (e.g. spacing, movement, speed, and preferred
shooting area). Ideally, passing turnovers would be used instead of general turnovers
(which include rule violations) but this metric was unavailable.
Recognition of expertise was also assessed using Offensive Rebound Percentage.
An offensive rebound is recorded when a player takes possession of the ball after a shot is
missed by a member of his own team. A defensive rebound is recorded when a player
takes possession of the ball after a shot is missed by a member of the opposing team. Part
of securing a rebound is anticipating not only whether a shot will be missed but also how
a shot will be missed (e.g. the trajectory the ball might take after it bounces off the rim),
which is often a function of the shot's characteristics (e.g. distance and arc). For example,
a missed shot attempted from a greater distance will often bounce off the rim with more
force and will take a faster trajectory. Similarly, a missed shot attempted with more arc
(height of the ball's parabola vertex) will often bounce off the rim with more force and
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will take on a trajectory with more height. Over time, team members are expected to
more accurately predict the rebound trajectory of the shots their team members miss
based on the shooter's tendencies.
In addition, Steals and Blocks are used as indicators of backup behaviors. A steal
is recorded when a defensive player takes possession of the ball from an offensive player
(not as a result of a rule violation). A block is recorded when a defensive player deflects
the shot attempt of an offensive player. Defensive players often record blocks while
assisting team members (backup behaviors) who are in disadvantageous positions. For
example, a team member who lets an offensive player get too close to the rim will often
be helped by a fellow team member, who may be able to block the offensive player's
shot. Similarly, defensive players often record steals when they provide defensive support
for fellow team members. Ideally, cross-positional steals and cross-positional blocks
would be analyzed, but these metrics were unavailable.
Like backup behaviors, shared mental models may be represented by behaviors on
defense. An example of a shared mental model is a shared defensive plan among players.
This was assessed using Opponent Points as an index. Opponent Points refers to the
number of points an opposing team scores. Team members typically share a mental
model of defense which guides behavior. For example, in some defensive models, each
defensive player is responsible for defending an offensive player. In other defensive
models, each defensive player is responsible for defending a specific area of the court,
and whichever offensive player occupies that area. Defensive models also dictate how
defensive players will react to certain situations, such as specific offensive plays, or
movements by specific players. Theoretically, the more effective defensive models will
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lead to fewer points scored by the opposing team. Since familial relationships are thought
to lead to greater coordination, they should be negatively related to Opponent Points.
Initially, Points Differential (Opponent Points subtracted from the number of
scored points) was used as the shared mental model index, in order to control for the
effect of the game pace (i.e. a faster pace leads to more possessions for the opposing team
and thus, more opportunities to score). However, Points Differential was found to have a
collinear relationship with Win/Loss Percentage, r(322) = .98, p< .001 and was excluded
from further analysis. The following model (Figure 1) summarizes the measures used in
this study:

Familial
Relationships
Coach-Coach
o Father-Son
o BrotherBrother
Player - Player
o BrotherBrother
Coach - Player
o Father-Son
o BrotherBrother

Team Processes
Metrics
Recognition of Expertise
o Assist/Turnover
Ratio
o Offensive
Rebounds

Team Performance
Metrics
Win/Loss
Percentage
NCAA Tournament
Berths

Back-up behaviors
o Steals
o Blocks

Final Four
Appearances

Shared Mental Models
o Opponent Points

National
Championships

Figure 1. Measures of familial relationships, process, and performance
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Samples
Records of documented familial relationships between players and coaches were
obtained from the NCAA, and were used as a starting point for data collection. Online
sources (e.g. sports-reference.com, Wikipedia, team websites) were used to verify data
and search for other familial relationships within teams. From 1925 to 2015, 499
documented familial relationships were found. The average number of familial
relationships per season was calculated for the analyses. Team performance data were
obtained from NCAA Men’s DI Basketball archives and sports-reference.com archives.
However, not all metrics were available for the same time period. The dataset was
grouped into two subsets. The first subset includes all available data, and the second
subset spans two different time periods. Two additional time periods (1997 to 2015 and
2002 to 2015) were excluded. Results from these time periods mirrored results from
Sample C.
The first sample (Sample A) is comprised of 477 teams. This sample includes
performance metrics (e.g. Win/Loss Percentage, NCAA Tournament Berths, Final Four
Appearances, and National Championships) from seasons 1893 to 2015. This sample also
includes any team with at least one NCAA DI season recorded. There are 499
documented familial relationships from 1925 to 2015 in this sample, which represents all
of the family relationships found.
The second sample is comprised of 324 teams across two different time periods
(Sample B and Sample C). Sample B includes seasons ranging from 1960 to 2015. This
time period was selected in order to reduce the potential effect of non-random missing
data (e.g. lack of reporting familial relationships during earlier seasons). Using this time
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period, 91.7% of the documented familial relationships were retained. After excluding
any teams whose only active seasons ranged from 1893 to 1959, two selection criteria
were used for the remaining sample: teams still active (as of 2015) and teams with at least
10 active seasons between 1960 to 2015. With these criteria applied, the selected sample
is comprised of 324 teams with 447 family relationships. Win/Loss Percentage from
seasons 1960 to 2015 was the only performance metric used for this sample.
Sample C was used to analyze both team performance and team process metrics
and is comprised of the same 324 teams used in the Sample B. Sample C spanned seasons
ranging from 2010 to 2015 with 67 documented family relationships, and includes the
following measures: Opponent Points, Steals, Blocks, Assist/Turnover Ratio, and
Offensive Rebound Percentage. Table 1 describes the characteristics of each sample.

Table 1. Variable details of each sample
Sample

Teams

A

477

Seasons
Included
1893 - 2015

Family
Relationships
499

B

324

1960 - 2015

447



Win/Loss Percentage

C

324

2010 - 2015

67








Win/Loss Percentage
Opponent Points
Steals
Blocks
Assist/Turnover Ratio
Offensive Rebounds
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Team Performance and
Team Process Metrics
Win/Loss Percentage
NCAA Tournament Berths
Final Four Appearances
National Championships

RESULTS

Statistical analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS (Version 22). Descriptive
statistics and correlations for Sample A, Sample B, and Sample C are described in Tables
2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Hypothesis 1 was tested using all metrics from Samples A and B, and Win/Loss
percentage from Sample C. Results generally support Hypothesis 1. Significant, positive
correlations were found between familial relationships and five performance metrics.
MANOVA results suggest a significant effect of familial relationships on performance in
Sample A, Wilks’ λ= .04, F(360, 1210) = 4.39, p< .001, ηp2= .57.
Significant, positive correlations were found between Coach-Coach relationships
and two performance metrics (NCAA Tournament Berths and Final Four Appearances).
MANOVA results suggest a significant effect of Coach-Coach relationships on a
composite of metrics in Sample A, Wilks’ λ=.68, F(52, 1470) = 2.94, p< .001, ηp2= .09.
Player-Player relationships were most strongly related to better team performance.
Significant, positive correlations were found between Player-Player relationships and five
performance metrics. MANOVA results suggest a significant effect of Player-Player
relationships on a composite of team performance metrics in Sample A, Wilks’ λ=.07,
F(216, 1352) = 5.84, p< .001, ηp2= .48.
Significant, positive correlations were found between Coach-Player relationships
and two performance metrics (Win/Loss Percentage in Sample B and C). MANOVA
results suggest a significant effect of Coach-Player relationships on a composite of
performance metrics in Sample A, Wilks’ λ=.16, F(196, 1372) = 4.02, p< .001, ηp2= .36.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations (Sample A)
Correlations
4
5

2

1 Fam. Relations

M
SD 1
1.05 2.91 1

2 Coach-Coach

0.19 1.42 .39**

1

3 Player-Player

0.36 1.14 .31**

.07

1

4 Coach-Player

0.49 1.57 .92**

.09*

.05

1

5 Win/Loss

0.55 0.14 −.04

.03

.01

−.05 1

6 Tournaments

7.76 9.73 .11*

.14** .27**

.00

.61**

1

7 Final Four

0.78 2.33 .13**

.11*

.27**

.04

.45**

.63** 1

.08

.27**

.05

.33**

.48** .84** 1

8 Championships 0.19 0.91 .13**

3

6

7

**

. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*

Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlations (Sample B)
Correlations
2
3

1 Fam. Relations

M
SD 1
1.40 3.31 1

2 Coach-Coach

0.29 1.71 .74**

1

3 Player-Player

0.47 1.26 .46**

.01

1

4 Coach-Player

0.65 1.77 .81**

.37**

.16**

1

5 Win/Loss

0.55 0.09 .24**

.08

.21**

.23**

**

. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*
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5

1
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations (Sample C)
Correlations
4
5
6

M
SD 1
1 Fam. Relations 0.21 0.96 1

2

3

2 Coach-Coach

0.01 0.11 .11

1

3 Player-Player

0.08 0.54 .75** −.01 1

4 Coach-Player

0.12 0.65 .84** −.01 .29** 1

5 Win/Loss

0.52 0.13 .21** .06

6 Opp. Points

68

7 Steals

.20** .13*

7

8

−.08

−.59** 1

6.48 0.84 .03

.00

.05

.01

.14*

.08

8 Blocks

3.50 0.81 .12*

.00

.15** .05

.38**

−.15** .21** 1

9 Assist/TO

0.99 0.15 .20** .01

10 Off. Rebound 0.32 0.03 −.03

.17** .16** .70**

−.06 −.01

**

−.02

. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*
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10

1

−.03 −.07

3.68 −.09

9

−.11

1

−.37** −.07
−.11

.15** 1

.44** .21** −.32** 1

Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Significant, positive correlations were
found between familial relationships and two process metrics (Blocks and
Assist/Turnover Ratio). MANOVA results suggest a significant effect of familial
relationships on the two process metrics tested, Wilks’ λ=.77, F(46, 598) = 1.84, p = .001,
ηp2 = .12. No significant correlations were found between Coach-Coach relationships and
any of the process metrics.
Significant, positive correlations were found between Player-Player relationships
and two process metrics (Blocks and Assist/Turnover Ratio). MANOVA results suggest a
significant effect of Player-Player relationships on the two process metrics tested, Wilks’
λ=.84, F(20, 624) = 2.91, p< .001, ηp2 = .09.
Significant, positive correlations were found between Coach-Player relationships
and only one process metric (Assist/Turnover Ratio). Table 4 presents the correlation
statistics for each of these relationships.
Results from correlation analyses support the predicted link between familial
relationships and team performance in Hypothesis, as well as the link between familial
relationships and two of the five team process metrics (Blocks and Assist/Turnover
Ratio) in Hypothesis 2. However, the correlation analyses used the average number of
familial relationship per season, and so the problem of potential aggregation exists.
Supplementary analyses were conducted using Sample C in an attempt to sidestep this
problem. For these analyses, metrics were chosen based on the results of the correlation
analyses. Team performance was assessed using Win/Loss Percentage, and team
processes were assessed using Assist/Turnover Ratio and Blocks.
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First, a paired sample t-test was conducted using Sample C, which ranged from
2010 to 2015 with 67 familial relationships across 23 teams. For each team, the metrics
were averaged for the seasons in which familial relationships were present and compared
to the seasons in which no familial relationships were present. Results did not support
Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2, as no significant mean differences were found in
performance (Win/Loss Percentage) or process (Assist/Turnover Ratio and Blocks)
metrics using this grouping. Table 5 presents the results from the paired sample analysis.

Table 5. Paired sample t-test statistics for familial vs. non familial seasons

Win/Loss Percentage

Familial
Relationships
M
SD
0.63
0.15

No Familial
Relationships
M
SD
0.59
0.16

Assist/Turnover Ratio

1.1

0.18

1.1

0.18

−0.30

22

.00

.77

Blocks

4.0

1.16

3.9

1.16

1.0

22

.09

.32

t
0.99

df
22

d
.26

p
.33

**

. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*

A weakness of the paired sample t-test was that only 23 teams were analyzed.
Data from 301 other teams were included in Sample C but could not be used in the paired
sample analysis because there were no documented familial relationships in these teams
for this time period. To determine whether further analyses were appropriate, the
performance and process metrics were averaged for all the seasons in which familial
relationships were present (i.e. the seasons of the 23 teams used in the paired sample
17

analysis) and compared to all the seasons in which no familial relationships were present
(i.e. remaining seasons from all 324 teams in Sample C). To test the differences between
the two groups, a MANOVA was conducted with Win/Loss Percentage, Assist/Turnover
Ratio, and Blocks entered simultaneously. Results suggest a significant effect of familial
relationships on all three metrics, Wilks’ λ=.95, F(3, 343) = 5.89, p = .001, ηp2= .05.
Table 6 summarizes the effect of familial relationships on each metric.

Table 6. MANOVA summary for familial vs. non familial relationships
η p2

Dependent Variable
Win/Loss Percentage

df
1

F
15.35

p
< .001**

.04

Assist/Turnover Ratio

1

7.11

.008**

.02

Blocks

1

7.95

.005**

.02

**

. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*

Based on the results from the MANOVA, it was appropriate to examine the effect
of familial relationships on each metric using independent sample t-tests for each
comparison. Results suggest that teams with familial relationships record better Win/Loss
Percentages, Assist/Turnover Ratios, and a higher number of Blocks compared to teams
with no familial relationships. These results add support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis
2. Table 7 summarizes the descriptive statistics and group comparisons.
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Table 7. Summary of independent sample t-tests

Win/Loss Percentage

Familial
No Familial
Relationships
Relationships
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
t
df
d
p
23 0.63 0.15 324 0.51 0.13 3.92 345 .91 < .001**

Assist/Turnover Ratio

23

1.1

0.18 324 0.99 0.16 2.67 345 .68

.008**

Blocks

23

4.0

1.16 324

.005**

3.5

0.82 2.82 345 .59

**

. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*

To more effectively combat the aggregation problem, the next analysis did not use
averages. Instead, each team in a specific year was analyzed as a distinct team (e.g. Duke
from 2010 to 2015 = 6 distinct teams). Using Sample C, the 67 documented familial
relationships (coded as a dichotomy - Familial Relationships/No Familial Relationships)
were mapped onto 1940 distinct teams. MANOVA results suggest a significant effect of
familial relationships on all three metrics tested (Win/Loss Percentage, Assist/Turnover
Ratio and Blocks), Wilks’ λ=.98, F(3, 1936) = 13.87, p< .001, ηp2 = .02. Table 8
summarizes the MANOVA results.
Based on the MANOVA results, it was appropriate to further examine the effect
of familial relationships on each of the individual metrics using independent sample ttests for each comparison. Results add support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Table
9 summarizes the descriptive statistics and comparisons between groups.
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Table 8. MANOVA summary for non-aggregated metrics
η p2

Dependent Variable
Win/Loss Percentage

df
1

F
35.14

p
< .001**

.02

Assist/Turnover Ratio

1

24.19

< .001**

.01

Blocks

1

12.06

.001**

.01

**

. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*

Table 9. Summary of independent sample t-tests for distinct teams

Win/Loss Percentage

Familial
No Familial
Relationships
Relationships
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
t
df
d
55 0.65 0.17 1885 0.51 0.17 5.93 1938 .82

p
< .001**

Assist/Turnover Ratio

55 1.13 0.24 1885 0.99 0.20 4.92 1938 .70

< .001**

Blocks

55

4.0

1.24 1885 3.48 1.09 3.47 1938 .48

.001**

**

. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*

Team performance (Win/Loss Percentage) and team process (Assist/Turnover
Ratio and Blocks) metrics were also analyzed across familial relationship types (i.e.
Coach-Coach, Player-Player, and Coach-Player) in an exploratory manner. The 67
documented familial relationships were mapped onto each of the 1940 distinct teams in
Sample C based on relationship type. Of the 67 documented familial relationships, 18
were Player-Player relationships, 34 were Coach-Player relationships, and only two were
Coach-Coach relationships. Coach-Coach relationships were excluded from analyses.
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MANOVA results showed a significant main effect of relationship type on team
performance and team process metrics, Wilks’ λ=.75, F(3, 48) = 5.37, p = .003, ηp2 = .25.
An analysis of the effect of familial relationships on each individual metric revealed a
significant difference for Win/Loss Percentage and Blocks, but not Assist/Turnover
Ratio. Table 10 summarizes the MANOVA results.

Table 10. MANOVA summary for player-player vs. coach-player relationships
ηp2

Dependent Variable
Win/Loss Percentage

df
1

F
6.75

p
.01**

.12

Assist/Turnover Ratio

1

0.01

.93

.00

Blocks

1

7.73

.008**

.13

**

. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*

Based on the MANOVA results, it was appropriate to examine the effect of
familial relationship type on each metric (Win/Loss Percentage and Blocks) using
independent sample t-tests. Compared with teams with Coach-Player relationships, teams
with Player-Player relationships report higher levels of team performance (i.e. better
Win/Loss Percentage) and team process metrics (i.e. more Blocks). Table 11 summarizes
the descriptive statistics and comparisons between relationship types.
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Table 11. Summary of t-tests for distinct teams across relationship types

Win/Loss Percentage

Player-Player
Relationships
N
M
SD
18 0.73 0.14

Coach-Player
Relationships
N
M
SD
t
34 0.61 0.18 2.60

df
50

d
.72

p
.012*

Blocks

18 4.74 1.33

34

50

.82

.008**

3.79 1.07 2.78

**

. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*

Based on the results from Hypothesis 2, Assist/Turnover Ratio and Blocks were
used to test the mediation effect predicted by Hypothesis 3. Mediation analyses were
conducted using the PROCESS (Version 2.15) macro for SPSS (Preacher & Hayes,
2008). The conceptual model is presented in Figure 2.

Assist/
Turnover
Ratio (M1)

Blocks
(M2)

Familial
Relationships

Win/Loss
Percentage

(X)

(Y)

Figure 2. Conceptual model of mediation effect
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Assist/Turnover Ratio was entered into the model first as it was more highly
correlated with Familial Relationships (compared with Blocks). Results suggest that full
mediation was found. After controlling for Assist/Turnover Ratio and Blocks, Win/Loss
Percentage no longer significantly correlated with Familial Relationships. The mediation
analysis is summarized in Table 12.

Table 12. Model summaries for mediation analysis

Predictor

Outcome

Control

Control

(X)
Familial
Relationships

(Y)
Assist/
Turnover
Ratio

(M1)

(M2)

Familial
Relationships

Blocks

Assist/
Turnover
Ratio

Familial
Relationships

Win/Loss
Percentage

Assist/
Turnover
Ratio

Blocks

**

. Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
. Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

*
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b

SE

p

R2

6.72

1.81

< .001**

.04

16.75

9.90

.092

.03

1.22

1.05

.25

.57

DISCUSSION

The relationship between familial relationships and team performance runs
counter to the logic of anti-nepotism policies. Results of this study showed that on
average, teams with familial relationships performed better than teams with no familial
relationships. Consistent with previous research, more effective coordination is believed
to be a key aspect of the superior performance outcomes. Thus, for teams whose task
work relies at least partly on coordination, the familiarity that comes with familial
relationships is expected to enhance team performance. The findings may be applied to
live-action teams such as medical teams, military teams, emergency rescue teams, and
perhaps spaceflight teams. This presents organizational decision makers with important
information to consider when formulating nepotism policies.
Like most focused examinations, results also showed this relationship is more
complex than it appears. Different types of familial relationships had different apparent
effects on team processes. Player-Player relationships had the strongest link to better
team performance, and were most strongly associated with more effective coordination
(i.e. backup behaviors and recognition of expertise). In retrospect, this seems obvious, as
coordination processes are presumably more salient for Player-Player relationships (i.e.
individuals performing task work). Coaches do communicate, share information, and
plan; but these processes are distinct from coordination, at least in a live, skill-based
behavioral sense. Thus, organizational decision makers may want to consider factors such
as team composition, task work, and skill requirements when formulating policies
regarding the hiring of family members.
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Limitations
Although a major strength of the study was analyzing a dataset that represented
the entire population, there were also several limitations. Perhaps the most apparent is the
all-male college-aged sample, which makes generalization to other kinds of teams in
employment settings problematic. Potential under-reporting of familial relationships also
poses a problem. If the actual number of family relationships in teams was greater than
the relatively low base rate in this data, then the family - performance relationship may
have been underestimated. This seems likely given the potential number of cousins on
teams, for example. The overall effect of this might have been to attenuate, given
restriction of range on the (familial relationship) predictor. Another limitation relates to
statistical analyses conducted. Although these data came from a considerable time period,
we did not have data that lent itself easily to longitudinal analyses. In particular, low base
rates of the primary predictor variable (familial relationships) made corrections for autocorrelation difficult. Time-series effects would have provided for some cause-effect
inferences.

Future Research
Future research on his topic may consider obtaining non-archival data from
different types of teams and settings using analyses that will allow for cause and effect
inferences. It may also be of interest to more directly measure team coordination
processes, such as back up behaviors and recognition of expertise, in order to further
understand the inner workings of these relationships.

25

REFERENCES

Andres, H. P. (2011). Shared mental model development during technology-mediated
collaboration. International Journal of E-Collaboration, 7(3), 14-30.
doi:10.4018/IJeC.2011070102
Arasli, H., & Tumer, M. (2008). Nepotism, favoritism and cronyism: A study of their
effects on job stress and job satisfaction in the banking industry of north
Cyprus. Social Behavior and Personality, 36(9), 1237-1250.
Baumann, M. R., & Bonner, B. L. (2013).Member awareness of expertise, information
sharing, information weighting, and group decision making. Small Group
Research, 44(5), 532-562.doi:10.1177/1046496413494415
Bellow, A. (2003). In praise of nepotism: A natural history / Adam Bellow. New York:
Doubleday.
Bonner, B. L. (2004). Expertise in Group Problem Solving: Recognition, Social
Combination, and Performance. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and
Practice, 8(4), 277-290. doi:10.1037/1089-2699.8.4.277
Bourbousson, J., Poizat, G., Saury, J., & Seve, C. (2010). Team coordination in
Basketball: Description of the cognitive connections among teammates. Journal
of Applied Sport Psychology, 22(2), 150-166. doi:10.1080/10413201003664657
Cannon-Bowers J, Salas E, Converse S. Shared mental models in expert team decision
making. Individual and group decision making: Current issues [e-book].
Hillsdale, NJ, England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc; 1993:221-246.
Available from: PsycINFO, Ipswich, MA.
Darioly A, Riggio RE. Nepotism in the hiring of leaders: Is there a stigmatization of
relatives? Swiss Journal of Psychology. 73: 243-248. DOI: 10.1024/14210185/a000143
Denison, D., Lief, C. and Ward, J. L. (2004), Culture in Family-Owned Enterprises:
Recognizing and Leveraging Unique Strengths. Family Business Review, 17: 61–
70. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-6248.2004.00004.x
EEOC v. Rath Packing Company, 1986, EEOC 75-239, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) P
6492, at 4260-61 (Mar. 2, 1976)
Forest, C. (2003). Empowerment skills for family workers: A worker handbook. Cornell
University.

26

Gershgoren, L. (2013). The development and validation of the shared mental models in
team sports questionnaire. Dissertation Abstracts International Section A, 73.
Gorman J. C., Amazeen P. G., Cooke N. J.(2010). Team coordination dynamics.
Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences, 14, 265–289.
Gordon, G., & Nicholson, N. (2008).Family wars classic conflicts in family business and
how to deal with them. Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page.
Gulati, R., Wohlgezogen, F., & Zhelyazkov, P. (2012). The two facets of collaboration:
Cooperation and coordination in strategic alliances. The Academy of Management
Annals, 6(1), 531-583. doi:10.1080/19416520.2012.691646
Gutman, A. (2012). Nepotism and employment law. In R. G. Jones, R. G. Jones (Eds.),
Nepotism in organizations (pp. 11-41). New York, NY, US: Routledge/Taylor &
Francis Group.
Hidayanto, A. N., & Setyady, S. T. (2014).Impact of collaborative tools utilization on
group performance in university students. TOJET: The Turkish Online Journal of
Educational Technology, 13(2), 88-98.
Ho, V. T., & Wong, S. (2009). Knowing who knows what and who knows whom:
Expertise recognition, network recognition, and individual work performance.
Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 82(1), 147-158.
doi:10.1348/096317908X298585
Jones, R., Stevens, M., & Fischer, D. (1999).Staffing a moving target: Selection in team
contexts. In J.F. Kehoe (Ed.) Managing Selection in Today’s Organizations. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Jones, R.G., Stout, T., Harder, B., Levine, E., Levine, J., & Sanchez, J.I. (2008).
Personnel psychology and nepotism: Should we support anti-nepotism policies?
The Industrial/Organizational Psychologist, 45(3), 17-20.
Kolbe, M., & Boos, M. (2009).Facilitating Group Decision-Making: Facilitator's
Subjective Theories on Group Coordination. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung /
Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 10(1).
Klimoski, R., & Mohammed, S. (1994). Team mental model: Construct or metaphor?
Journal Of Management, 20(2), 403-437. doi:10.1016/0149-2063(94)90021-3
Laker, D. R., & Williams, M. L. (2003). Nepotism’s effect on employee satisfaction and
organizational commitment: An empirical study. International Journal of Human
Resources Development and Management, 3, 191-202.

27

Littlepage, G. E., & Mueller, A. L. (1997). Recognition and utilization of expertise in
problem-solving groups: Expert characteristics and behavior. Group Dynamics:
Theory, Research, and Practice, 1(4), 324-328. doi:10.1037/1089-2699.1.4.324
Mehta, J., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1994). The nature of salience: An experimental
investigation of pure coordination games. American Economic Review, 84, 658673. doi:10.1007/BF01079211.
Melis, Alicia P. (2013). The evolutionary roots of human collaboration; coordination and
sharing of resources. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Volume
1299, Sociability, Responsibility, and Criminality: From Lab to Law pages 68-76.
Sep. 2013. DOI: 10.1111/nyas.12263
MSPB | Prohibited Personnel Practices of the Month (MSPB | Prohibited Personnel
Practices of the Month) http://www.mspb.gov/ppp/mayppp.htm
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for
assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior
Research Methods, 40, 879-891.
Salas, E., Cooke, N. J., & Gorman, J. C. (2010). The science of team performance:
Progress and the need for more…. Human Factors, 52(2), 344-346.
doi:10.1177/0018720810374614
Salas, E., & Goodwin, G. F., & Burke, C. S. (2009).Team effectiveness in complex
organizations : cross-disciplinary perspectives and approaches. Routledge, New
York.
Segal, N. L., McGuire, S. A., Miller, S. A., & Havlena, J. (2008). Tacit coordination in
monozygotic twins, dizygotic twins and virtual twins: Effects and implications of
genetic relatedness. Personality and Individual Differences, 45(7), 607-612.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2008.06.022
Su, E., & Carney, M. (2013). Can China’s family firms create intellectual capital? Asia
Pacific Journal of Management, 30(3), 657-675. doi:10.1007/s10490-012-9302-z
Tibbetts, J. R. (1995). The Impact of the Human Dimension on a Three-Man-Crew Tank.
Army command and general staff coll. Fort Leavenworth, KS. School of
advanced military studies.
Tziner, A., &Vardi, Y. (1983). Ability as a moderator between cohesiveness and tank
crewsperformance. Journal of Occupational Behaviour, 4(2), 137-143.
Vallejo, M. C.. (2008). Is the Culture of Family Firms Really Different? A Value-Based
Model for Its Survival through Generations. Journal of Business Ethics, 81(2),
261–279. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25482213

28

Werbel, J. D., & Hames, D. S. (1996). Anti-nepotism reconsidered: The case of husband
and wife employment. Group & Organization Management, 21(3), 365-379.
doi:10.1177/1059601196213006
Woolsey, M.A. (2014). Perceptions of nepotism in a cultural context. Unpublished
master’s thesis, Missouri State University.

29

